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The Contribution of Bank Lending to the Long-Term Stagnation in Japan 
While it is well established that bank lending to severely impaired (zombie) Japanese 
firms during the 1990s was detrimental to the Japanese economy, bank lending to troubled, but 
economically viable, firms may have had beneficial effects.  The objective of this study is to 
investigate the consequences of increased bank lending to distressed Japanese firms in order to 
determine the extent to which those increased loans contributed to the recovery of distressed 
firms, rather than being used to insulate the firms from market forces in order to avoid the 
painful, but needed, restructuring.  That is, is increased lending to a distressed firm associated 
with an improvement in the subsequent performance of the firm? 
Certainly, bank lending to some severely distressed (zombie) firms did allow those firms 
to survive for an extended period of time, even though they were not economically viable firms.  
While such lending has been shown to have contributed to the recent prolonged stagnation of the 
Japanese economy (for example, Caballero et al. 2006), bank lending to distressed firms has the 
potential to help as well as hinder firm recovery.  Presumably, an important factor in the ability 
of firms to survive and return to health will be their ability and willingness to restructure their 
operations.  Insofar as increased bank credit provides a necessary cushion to distressed firms that 
allows them the opportunity to overcome temporary liquidity problems and/or restructure their 
operations, one might expect firms receiving increased bank loans to be more likely to undertake 
the required restructuring necessary to improve their operations and return them to financial 
health, or at least to prevent an illiquidity problem from becoming a solvency problem.  However, 
while increased bank credit may enhance the ability of the firm to undertake restructuring, this 
increased funding also may ease the immediate pressure on management to take actions to ensure 
the firm’s longer-term survival, lessening the incentive (and thus the willingness) of the firm to 
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undertake the painful steps required to accomplish a major restructuring before it is too late for 
the firm’s survival.  Certainly, in some instances nonviable firms were kept alive for an extended 
period of time through support from their lenders, in part due to the perverse incentives banks 
had to evergreen loans (for example, Peek and Rosengren 2005).  However, for other distressed 
firms that were economically viable, perhaps through undertaking substantial restructuring, the 
provision of support from their banks or other stakeholders could contribute to the ability of 
those firms to return to sound financial health.   
Substantial evidence exists that banks contributed to the long-term stagnation of the 
Japanese economy by aiding zombie firms.  However, given the severe banking problems in 
Japan and the widespread blame placed on the lending behavior of the banking sector for 
prolonging the economic malaise in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s, it is useful to better 
understand the extent to which bank lending behavior also may have contributed to the recovery 
of distressed, but viable, firms, insofar as doing so may have contributed to a shortening of the 
length of the period of economic stagnation.   
The evidence suggests that increases in main bank loans did, in fact, improve firms’ 
return on assets during the period immediately after they entered either financial or operational 
distress.  However, this effect comes primarily from the 1980s subperiod.  No evidence of 
increased main bank loans improving firm performance is found for the last half of the 1990s 
when the banking crisis was most severe and Japanese banks faced perverse incentives to make 
credit available to the weakest firms.  That is, main banks, which should have had the best 
information about the viability of their loan customers, were unable to identify distressed firms 
that were viable and then help those firms recover by making additional credit available to them.  
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The study proceeds as follows.  Section I provides a discussion of relevant previous 
studies.  Section II describes the data and methods.  Sections III and IV contain the empirical 
results for firms entering financial distress and operational distress, respectively.  Section V 
concludes.  
 
I.  Background 
Banking relationships in Japan are far more important than in the United States.  While 
the U.S. is characterized as a market-centered economy, Japan is considered to be a bank-
centered economy.  Japanese firms rely more on bank debt than firms in the United States, 
although bond financing in Japan has become increasingly important over the past decade (Hoshi 
and Kashyap 1999).  But the differences go deeper than simply the relative importance of 
relationship versus arm’s length financing in the two countries.  The relationships between banks 
and firms in Japan are much stronger, being characterized by main bank relationships, as well as, 
in many instances, additional ties arising from cross-shareholdings and keiretsu affiliations 
between the lending bank and the firm.  Furthermore, Japanese capitalism differs from the style 
prevalent in the United States, especially when it comes to the allocation of credit.  That 
Japanese banks have duties other than to maximize profits is made clear by the banking laws that 
require new investors and current owners with more than 20 percent ownership in a bank to 
obtain regulatory approval, including satisfying a condition that large shareholders “fully 
understand a bank’s social responsibilities” (The Economist 2002).  Thus, many bank lending 
decisions are guided by the perceived national duty of banks to support troubled firms, rather 
than being a result of the careful credit risk analysis that would dominate the decision were a 
profit maximization motive the primary consideration.   
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Keiretsu group affiliations also play an important role in corporate governance in Japan.  
Horizontal (bank-centered) keiretsu groups are composed of firms in many different industries 
that are usually affiliated with the group’s key lender and have substantial cross-shareholdings 
with each other and with the group’s primary bank.  Firms exchange information and have 
“Presidents Clubs” where the top firm managers meet to discuss relevant issues.  In addition, 
firms within a given keiretsu often have extensive business relationships, may exchange 
managers, and may have risk-sharing, or insurance, relationships that help member firms deal 
with adverse shocks.  Furthermore, the cross-shareholding provides protection against hostile 
takeovers, insulating managers from market discipline.1  
These main bank and keiretsu affiliations have received a great deal of attention in 
descriptions of the Japanese economy and have played a key role in many explanations of 
Japanese economic performance, both during the Japanese “miracle” characterized by rapid 
growth following World War II and during the “lost decade” of the 1990s.  During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, most studies of Japanese corporate affiliations found significant benefits.  More 
recently, however, studies have been more critical of Japanese corporate affiliations, viewing 
such affiliations as a problem that has contributed to a decade of subpar economic growth, rather 
than as an alternative market model (Morck and Nakamura 1999; Kang and Stultz 2000; Peek 
and Rosengren 2005).  If the primary role of corporate affiliations is to insulate management 
from market forces by enabling firms to avoid the discipline that can be provided by external 
creditors and investors, this limiting of outside corporate governance would manifest itself in a 
misallocation of credit.  Strong corporate affiliations would allow weak firms to sustain their 
operations relatively unchanged, rather than being forced by external creditors and shareholders 
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to make the tough restructuring choices necessary to recover, or, if the firm is not economically 
viable, to fail.   
A. Historical Roles of Main Banks and Keiretsus 
The firm-main bank relationship in Japan is solidified in a number of ways.  The main 
bank takes primary responsibility for monitoring the firm and can serve as a form of corporate 
governance (Kaplan and Minton 1994).  The main bank is particularly important during times of 
distress, when it can require changes in the affiliated firm’s management and alter its board of 
directors (Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Morck and Nakamura 1999).  This oversight provided by 
the bank can reduce typical information asymmetries, resulting in firms having greater access to 
external credit, which, in turn, affects firms’ investment decisions (Hoshi et al. 1991).  However, 
there is a dark side to this close lending relationship:  If the bank rather than the borrower 
becomes troubled, the ability of the firm to finance investment may be impeded (Gibson 1995; 
Kang and Stultz 2000; Klein et al. 2002). 
Studies based on data from the pre-bubble period have tended to find that Japanese bank-
firm affiliations provided significant benefits.  These studies emphasized the unique features of 
Japanese bank affiliations that reduced agency costs (Hoshi et al. 1990, 1993).  Banks with 
intertwined business relationships, shareholding relationships, board of directors relationships, 
and financing relationships with their loan customers should have substantially more information 
about those firms than do external monitors.  Thus, a firm’s main bank would play a key role as 
the delegated monitor for the group of lenders to the firm and other stakeholders in the firm.  
While a firm’s main bank might not play an active role in influencing the management of a firm 
during good times, when a firm’s health deteriorated substantially, the main bank would be 
expected to step in and provide guidance and support to the firm, and lead any necessary 
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“rescue” or reorganization of the firm (see, for example, Sheard 1989; Aoki 1990).  For example, 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that nonroutine turnover of top executives in response to poor 
earnings is greater for firms with strong ties to a main bank, and Morck and Nakamura (1999) 
find that bankers often are appointed to a troubled firm’s board of directors, presumably to 
supervise bailouts and/or restructurings.  Interestingly, Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that 
firms not in keiretsu groups are more likely to experience downsizing than those firms that are 
members of a bank group, suggesting that main banks tend to insulate their keiretsu firms from 
market forces. 
In addition to managerial guidance, one might expect that a firm would benefit from the 
cushion provided by its main bank or members of its keiretsu, insofar as they were willing to 
provide backup financing or other forms of aid should the firm become financially troubled.  In 
fact, Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms with strong main bank ties perform better than those 
without such ties after the onset of financial distress, and the performance is improved further if 
the firm also is a keiretsu member with close ties to its suppliers and customers as well as its 
main bank.   
A possible explanation for the value of group membership is that the private information 
derived from the close affiliations between the firm and its main bank and keiretsu group 
members would tend to provide an earlier signal of problems and enable the main bank to 
intervene earlier to help the firm deal with any deterioration in its financial health.  Certainly, the 
relatively low numbers of listed Japanese firms that go bankrupt is consistent with the hypothesis 
that main banks play an important role in the early recognition of problems and the main bank’s 
ability to rescue a troubled firm from bankruptcy.  Alternatively, the relatively low bankruptcy 
rate may simply be a result of the main bank wanting to preserve its reputation or be due to a 
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sense of loyalty among group members, even if that means bailing out a nonviable firm rather 
than aiding only those group firms that are viable in the longer term but are suffering from a 
temporary adverse shock or liquidity problem.  
In contrast, other studies argue that the benefits of close firm-main bank ties may be 
limited.  For example, while Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find that a close relationship with a 
firm’s main bank increases the availability of credit, this does not lead to higher profitability or 
growth for the firm, perhaps because the bank discourages the firm from investing in high risk, 
high expected return projects, or because the bank is able to “hold up” the firm and extract all the 
rents.  Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) go even further, arguing that, based on pre-bubble period data, 
main banks do not, in fact, rescue distressed borrowers.  Closer main bank ties do not increase 
the probability of increases in main bank loans or of a distressed firm’s survival.    
B. Post-Bubble Evidence 
Much of the evidence from the 1990s has been interpreted in a way that is not necessarily 
supportive of main bank and keiretsu affiliations benefiting firms, at least in the longer run, and 
certainly not benefiting the macroeconomy more generally.  Rather, while possibly aiding 
individual distressed firms in the short run, the close affiliations of Japanese banks with their 
borrowers have been viewed by many as contributing to more than a decade of subpar economic 
growth.  In particular, if the primary role of bank (and keiretsu) affiliations is to insulate 
management from market forces by enabling firms to avoid the discipline that can be provided 
by external creditors and investors, this limiting of outside corporate governance would manifest 
itself as a misallocation of credit that could delay both needed restructuring of distressed, but 
economically viable, firms and the failure of nonviable (zombie) firms, impeding the creative 
destruction that would contribute to the reallocation of valuable resources to their best uses.   
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Focusing on the immediate post-bubble period (1990-93), Kang and Stultz (2000) find 
that the stock return performance of firms that were more dependent on bank loans just prior to 
the bursting of the stock price and land price bubbles was worse than for firms that were less 
dependent on bank loans.  They also find that keiretsu membership, defined to include both 
horizontal (bank-centered) and vertical keiretsus, is related to a worse stock return performance.  
This evidence suggests that, at least during the initial phase of the banking problems and 
prolonged malaise of the Japanese economy, those firms most closely tied to banks were 
adversely impacted by that relationship.  While those firms that relied relatively more on bank 
loans had relatively better stock return performance during the good times of the bubble period, 
once the bubbles burst, those same firms contracted investment more and suffered worse stock 
return performance relative to those firms that relied less on bank loans.  Thus, in contrast to the 
findings of Hoshi et al. (1990), for example, once the banking sector began suffering widespread 
problems in the early 1990s, banks were unable to insulate their borrowers from financial stress.   
Considering the subsequent period from 1993-99, Guo (2007) finds evidence consistent 
with that of Kang and Stultz (2000).  While during the 1978-92 period, distressed firms with a 
greater reliance on main bank loans had higher sales growth, and that performance was not 
affected by the main bank’s health, during the subsequent 1993-99 period, a greater reliance on 
main bank loans was associated with slower sales growth, and that sales growth rate was lower 
the weaker was the main bank’s health.  Similarly, for the 1993-99 period, a greater reliance on 
main bank loans and weaker main bank health also was associated with the firm having a lower 
return on assets.  In addition, during this latter period, the duration of distress was longer for 
firms with a greater reliance on main bank loans.  Consistent with the findings by Kang and 
Stultz (2000), this suggests that once bank health had deteriorated, being tied closely to a main 
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bank was not beneficial to a firm.  That is, main banks were no longer able, or perhaps willing, to 
aid distressed firms sufficiently for those firms to outperform similar firms that relied less on 
main bank loans.  In contrast, Guo (2007) finds that keiretsu affiliations are beneficial to firms, 
even in the latter period, perhaps because other group firms pick up some of the burden of 
helping distressed group firms that main banks are unable or unwilling to shoulder. 
However, the fact that the performance of firms with close ties to their main bank 
suffered is somewhat puzzling, insofar as it appears that many firms increased their reliance on 
bank loans during the latter half of the 1990s, even as the bond market had been deregulated (for 
example, Peek and Rosengren 2005; Arikawa and Miyajima 2006).  This would suggest that 
many of the firms obtaining increased bank loans must have been among the weakest Japanese 
firms, so that the main bank assistance was either not sufficient, or not used appropriately, to 
enable the firms to recover from their financial distress.  In fact, using data for the 1998 fiscal 
year, Hori and Osano (2002) find that firms with weaker prospects and a greater likelihood of 
suffering financial distress rely more on main bank loans.  Similarly, Arikawa and Miyajima 
(2006) found that firms with low growth opportunities increased their reliance on bank loans in 
the 1990s. 
Why would banks have increased loans to some of the weakest firms?  Peek and 
Rosengren (2005) argue that banks did so in response to the perverse incentives they faced due to 
the way in which bank regulation and supervision was handled in Japan.  Troubled Japanese 
banks had an incentive to allocate additional loans to their severely impaired borrowers in order 
to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets.  As a bank’s reported capital ratio 
approached the regulatory minimum, banks were more likely to increase loans to the weakest 
firms.  Furthermore, this behavior was more pronounced for firms with strong bank and keiretsu 
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ties.  Caballero et al. (2006) investigate the implications of bank lending to these “zombie” firms 
for the Japanese macroeconomy.  They argue that this evergreening of loans to zombie firms 
distorted competition and impaired needed restructuring of distressed firms, lowering 
productivity and increasing excess capacity in the economy.  This evidence is consistent with the 
finding by Arikawa and Miyajima (2006) that the main bank system impeded needed creative 
destruction during the prolonged malaise of the 1990s when the Japanese banking sector was in 
crisis, insofar as greater reliance on main bank loans tended to delay the restructuring of poorly 
performing firms. 
C. Restructuring 
Did main bank and keiretsu affiliations aid or hinder corporate restructuring in Japan in 
the 1990s?  Much of the literature cited above would be pessimistic about such corporate 
affiliations promoting needed restructuring in Japan during this period.  Rather, the arguments 
would tend to favor main banks insulating distressed firms from the market forces that might 
otherwise have forced firms to make major operational changes, or even to declare bankruptcy.  
Thus, an important question concerns the extent to which increased bank lending helped or 
impeded a firm’s recovery from distress.    
Considering 92 publicly traded Japanese manufacturing firms during the pre-bubble 
period (1986-90), Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find that troubled Japanese firms downsize assets 
less frequently, reduce employees through layoffs to a lesser degree, and are more likely to 
expand operations than is the case for similar U.S. firms.  Furthermore, they find that the 
responses by the Japanese firms are related to the extent of ownership by the firm’s main bank 
and by large blockholders.  Firms with greater equity ownership by their main bank are more 
likely to shrink operations, institute employee layoffs, and remove outside directors from the 
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firm’s board.  Similarly, greater ownership of the firm by blockholders is associated with a 
higher probability of downsizing of operations and changes in firm management, and a lower 
probability of acquisitions by the firm.  Thus, at least in the pre-bubble period, it appears that 
main banks and large blockholders serve an important role in corporate governance for troubled 
firms by increasing the probability of a restructuring of operations, and, furthermore, it appears 
that the associated downsizing improves subsequent firm performance.   
These results are in sharp contrast to those from studies investigating the restructuring of 
Japanese firms in the post-bubble period.  For example, Arikawa and Miyajima (2006), Inoue et 
al. (2007) and Koibuchi (2007) each find that main bank relationships retarded rather than 
encouraged the restructuring of distressed Japanese firms in the 1990s.  Koibuchi (2007) argues 
that the traditional main-bank-led corporate restructuring broke down in the 1990s due to the 
burden of nonperforming loans on the banks.  Changes in the restructuring process and the 
creation of the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan that reduced the disproportionate 
burdens on main banks relative to other lenders to a distressed firm, rather than voluntary 
responses by lenders, were required to enhance the attractiveness of financial restructuring by the 
firm’s lenders.  Inoue et al. (2007) similarly argue that banks and affiliated firms procrastinated 
in implementing or imposing needed restructuring on distressed firms.  Instead, it was out-of-
court restructurings that were led by external sponsors or bank supervisors that were most 
effective and beneficial, in the sense of increasing the market value of the distressed firms.  The 
inability, or unwillingness, of main banks to push through needed restructuring at their distressed 
borrowers emanated from the weak supervisory pressures on the banks themselves.  The 
regulatory forbearance on banks was passed down the chain as forbearance on the borrowers 
from the banks, as banks responded to the perverse incentives they faced to evergreen loans. 
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Rather than focusing on the role of main banks and affiliated firms in impeding the 
financial restructuring of distressed firms in the post-bubble period, Arikawa and Miyajima 
(2006) investigate the operational restructuring of distressed firms by estimating the employment 
adjustment function.  While more leverage is associated with a greater shrinkage in employment, 
the composition of that debt mattered.  In particular, a higher ratio of main bank debt to total 
assets delayed restructuring, again suggesting that the main bank system impeded the needed 
restructuring in Japan during the prolonged malaise following the bursting of the stock price and 
land price bubbles when the banking sector was in crisis.   
 
II.  Data and Methods 
A.  Data sources 
Firm balance sheet and income data are from the Pacific-Basin Capital Market Databases 
(PACAP), which includes all first- and second-section firms that are traded on the Tokyo stock 
exchange.  The data are annual and based on the fiscal year-end reports by the firms, with the 
regression samples covering the period from fiscal year 1980 through fiscal year 2000.  The data 
for loans outstanding to individual firms from each lender are obtained from the Nikkei Needs 
Bank Loan database.  The data are annual, with loan reporting based on the firm’s fiscal year.  
Combining these two databases, individual Japanese firms can be linked to their individual 
lenders.  A firm’s main bank will be identified as the bank with the largest volume of loans 
outstanding to the firm in the prior year.  Horizontal (bank-centered) keiretsu membership is 
obtained from various issues of  Industrial Groupings in Japan:  The Anatomy of the Keiretsu.  
Because fiscal yearends are not standard in Japan, firms must be allocated to a fiscal year.  Firms 
with fiscal yearend months of July through the following June are allocated to the same fiscal 
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year; for example, July 1990 through June 1991 fiscal yearends would be included in fiscal year 
1990.  Most firms have a fiscal yearend of March, and relatively few have fiscal yearends in June 
or July. 
B.  Identifying distressed firms 
While there are a number of possible measures of financial distress, two types of distress 
are considered:  financial distress and operational distress.  Financial distress is based on a firm’s 
interest coverage ratio, following Hoshi et al. (1990).  To enter financial distress, a firm must 
have an interest coverage ratio for one year that is greater than one, followed by two consecutive 
years in which its interest coverage ratio is less than one.  The firm is deemed to become 
distressed in that second consecutive year with a coverage ratio less than one.  A given firm may 
enter distress more than one time during our sample period.  In order to qualify as a repeater, a 
firm must first recover from its earlier episode of distress, where recovery is defined as 
experiencing three consecutive years with an interest coverage ratio greater than one.  
Operational distress is based on a firm’s net income.  To enter operational distress, a firm must 
experience a year of positive net income followed by two consecutive years in which its net 
income is negative.  The firm is deemed to become operationally distressed in that second 
consecutive year with negative income.  In order to qualify as a repeater, a firm must first 
recover from its earlier episode of distress, where recovery is defined as experiencing three 
consecutive years with positive net income.   
Table 1 provides some preliminary evidence on the numbers of Japanese firms becoming 
distressed during each year of the 1980-2000 period.  For comparison, the table includes both 
financial distress based on the interest coverage ratio criteria in the first five columns and 
operational distress based on the net income criteria in the remaining five columns.  For financial 
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distress, the first column shows the number of firms entering distress in each year, while the 
second column shows the number of those firms that are repeaters, defined as any firm that 
enters distress status after having already been distressed during our sample period.  The next 
three columns show the percent of the firms entering financial distress (Column 1) that 
experienced an increase in loans in the year in which the firm enters distress (from t-1 to t), over 
the two-year period that also includes the prior year (from t-2 to t), and the three-year period 
from (t-3) to t, which includes the last “good” year before the interest coverage ratio fell below 
one.  The next five columns repeat the same information for operational distress.   
The table shows that both types of distress have very similar numbers in each year, with 
several waves of firms becoming distressed.  The number of firms entering distress rises 
temporarily in the early 1980s, the mid-1980s, the early 1990s, and the late 1990s.  Column 2 
shows that Japan experienced a steady stream of repeat offenders throughout the 1990s.  
Furthermore, the percentage of the firms that obtain increased loans during the year that they 
enter distress and just before is quite notable.  Interestingly, that percentage appears to subside 
somewhat as the 1990s come to an end. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the timing of the low points of the distress measures relative to the 
year in which the firms enter distress (t=0).  Table 2 indicates that a little more than one quarter 
of the firms hit bottom in the first year in which their coverage ratio falls below one.  The interest 
coverage ratio hits bottom in the year in which the firm enters distress (the second consecutive 
year with a coverage ratio less than one) for almost half of the firms.  Over 90 percent have 
reached their low point for their coverage ratio by the second year after having entered financial 
distress.  Consistent with the 1990s being deemed “the lost decade,” it takes much longer, on 
average, for financially distressed firms to reach the low point of their coverage ratio in the 
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1990s compared to the 1980s.  Table 3 shows a similar pattern for operational distress for the 
timing of the low point for net income.  Note that the final column indicates the number of firms 
that do not achieve a bottom.  This can occur because of bankruptcy, acquisition, or not 
achieving a bottom before the end of the available data. 
C.  Firm Performance, Horizons and Changes in Loans 
A number of important issues arise in specifying the relationship between bank lending 
and the recovery of distressed firms.  Once firms entering distress have been identified, one must 
then determine the variables to be used to measure subsequent firm performance, as well as 
investigating the appropriate horizon to be considered, both for the recovery period and for the 
period of increased bank loans to the firm.  In addition, increases and decreases in loans may 
have different impacts on firm performance.   
Two alternative measures for firm performance are considered:  return on assets (ROA) 
and the book-to-market ratio.  These measures provide different perspectives on firm 
performance.  ROA is an accounting measure, while the book-to-market ratio reflects the 
market’s (investors’) views of firm performance, as well as being forward looking.  Determining 
the appropriate horizons for both subsequent firm performance and prior bank lending involves 
issues associated with the length of the lag between a firm obtaining increased bank loans and 
the effect (and the persistence of the effect) on firm performance from putting the additional 
funds to work.  Because there is no obvious answer on theoretical grounds, alternative horizons 
are considered in the empirical specifications.  
The effects of increases and decreases in bank loans are separated because of the 
decisions underlying the changes in loans.  An increase in loans reflects active decisions by the 
firm to request additional loans and by the lender to grant the request.  On the other hand, no 
 15
change or a decline in loans outstanding can occur actively or passively, and, furthermore, may 
be difficult to interpret.  For example, a decline in loans can occur passively as existing loans 
amortize.  Alternatively, a decline in loans may occur due to a decline in loan demand by the 
firm, or even if the firm requests additional loans, by the lender not agreeing to supply additional 
loans or even to rollover maturing loans to the firm.  In contrast, a decline in loans outstanding 
may result from the lender helping the firm by forgiving loans or doing a debt for equity swap 
with the firm.  Thus, a decline in loans outstanding to a firm may reflect weak loan demand on 
the part of the firm, toughness on the part of the lender as it cuts loan supply to the firm, or even 
softness on the part of the lender as it forgives outstanding loans to the firm.  Because of the 
ambiguity of the interpretation of declines in bank loans, it is essential to allow increases and 
decreases in loans to have different effects.   
D.  Empirical Specification 
In addition to the change in loans, the specification must control for relevant firm 
characteristics, the macroeconomic environment, and industry performance.  The basic 
specification is: 
DPERFORM = a0 + a1FIRM + a2BANK + a3DLOAN + a4YEAR + ε ,    (1) 
where DPERFORM is the change in the performance measure for the firm from the year in 
which the firm enters distress, FIRM is a vector of firm characteristics, BANK is a vector of 
main bank characteristics, DLOAN is a vector including measures of the change in bank loans, 
and YEAR is a set of annual (1,0) dummy variables.  In order to control more precisely for 
industry effects, each variable (other than the measures of keiretsu membership and main bank 
health) are constructed as deviations from the median value for all firms in the focus firm’s 
industry in the given year.  For example, a variable X is measured as X minus the median value 
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of X for that year for the firms in the same industry as the focus firm, and the change in a 
variable X is measured as the change in the firm’s value of X minus the change in the median 
value for X for the firms in the focus firm’s industry in the given year. 
The change in the two alternative firm performance variables, ROA and the book-to-
market ratio, are calculated as the difference between the values calculated as a percentage and 
are measured over two alternative horizons:  the year after the firm enters distress (D1ROA and 
D1BKMKT) and the two-year period after the firm enters distress (D12ROA and D12BKMKT).  
Using t as the year in which the firm enters distress, the measures would be constructed as:  (t+1) 
– t and (t+2) – t.  The benefit of using the two-year horizon is that the effects of increases in 
loans may either impact firm performance with a lag or persist for more than one period.  In 
addition, measuring firm performance over a two-year horizon rather than a one-year horizon 
would be expected to reduce any noise in the series.   
The set of firm characteristics includes the logarithm of firm assets (LASSET); the firm’s 
leverage ratio (LEV), defined as total debt / total assets; bonds outstanding / total assets 
(BONDA); four equity ownership measures indicating the ownership shares of the firm held by 
financial institutions (OWNFIN), securities companies (OWNSEC), corporations (OWNCORP), 
and foreigners (OWNFOR), with the ownership shares held by government and individual 
investors omitted to avoid multicollinearity problems; a (1,0) dummy variable, KEIR, with a 
value of 1 if the firm is a member of a horizontal (bank-centered) keiretsu, and zero otherwise.   
BANK includes two main bank characteristics, where the main bank is designated as the 
bank with the largest volume of loans outstanding to the firm in that year.2  The first measure is 
the share of total loans outstanding to the firm provided by the firm’s main bank (MBLNSH).  
The second measure reflects the health of the main bank (BKHLTH), and is measured as the 
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book-to-market ratio of the main bank.  In order to have a higher value of BKHLTH correspond 
to better health, the negative of the book-to-market value is used.   
The vector DLOAN includes measures of the change in bank loans scaled by the previous 
year’s total assets.  The base specification includes the change in total loans for the period in 
which the firm enters distress (DLNT) and each of the two prior years (DLNT1 and DLNT2).  
This specification also includes the same three measures for main bank loans (DLNMB, 
DLNMB1, DLNMB2) to allow main bank loans to have a differential effect, measured by the 
estimated coefficients on the main bank loan variables.  Because changes in loans to a firm are 
likely to be correlated from one year to the next, we also calculate measures of the change in 
loans over the two-year period from the beginning of the year prior to entering distress to the end 
of the year in which the firm enters distress (t- (t-2)), and the three-year period covering from 
two years prior to entering distress through the year in which the firm enters distress (t – (t-3)).  
Here, we disaggregate the change in total loans into two components:  main bank loans 
(DLNMB2Y and DLNMB3Y) and secondary bank loans (DLNSB2Y and DLNSB3Y).  Finally, 
because increases and decreases in bank loans may have different effects, we also disaggregate 
the two-year and three-year measures of the change in loans into observations with positive 
changes (DLNMB2Y_POS, DLNMB3Y_POS, DLNSB2Y_POS and DLNSB3Y_POS) and 
negative changes (DLNMB2Y_NEG, DLNMB3Y_NEG, DLNSB2Y_NEG and 
DLNSB3Y_NEG).  Note that this refers to whether the raw change in loans is positive or 
negative, not whether the transformed loan measures that are deviations from median industry 
values are positive or negative.  Finally, each regression includes a set of year dummy variables 
to further control for general macroeconomic activity.   
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III.  Empirical Results:  Financial Distress 
 Table 4 contains the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables used 
in the regressions.  For each variable, outliers have been removed, where outliers are defined as 
values that are more than four standard deviations away from the mean value of the variable.  
The first four columns contain the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for 
the more familiar untransformed variables, meaning the values of the variables before the 
industry median values are subtracted.  The last four columns show the same information for the 
variables after being transformed by subtracting the industry median values.  These latter 
variables are the ones used in the regression analysis.  Recall that only the four dependent 
variables (D1ROA, D12ROA, D1BKMKT, and D12BKMKT) are calculated as percentages in 
order to scale the estimated coefficients in the regressions, and that KEIR and BKHLTH have 
not been transformed by subtracting the industry median values.   
Table 5 presents the results for the basic specification for firms entering financial distress 
for all four dependent variables.  Focusing on the first two columns for subsequent firm 
performance measured by improvement in ROA, firms with a higher leverage ratio (debt/assets) 
improve more.  At the longer two-year horizon, having greater ownership by corporations also is 
associated with more improvement, perhaps because firms with an ownership stake in a 
distressed firm tend to help the firm.  On the other hand, keiretsu membership is associated with 
less performance improvement.  Having a healthier main bank is associated with greater 
improvement, perhaps because the main bank is in a better position to aid the distressed firm.  
Among the change in loans variables, the one-year and two-year lagged values of the change in 
main bank loans have positive and significant estimated coefficients, indicating that increases in 
main bank loans have a greater effect than increases in loans generally (that is, a greater effect 
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than an increase in secondary bank loans).  This result is consistent with main banks coming to 
the aid of distressed firms and helping them overcome financial distress.   
The last two columns of the table provide results for the book-to-market ratio measure of 
firm performance.  Note that the results are presented for the negative of the book-to-market ratio 
for ease of interpretation; an estimated positive coefficient indicates an improvement in firm 
performance (a reduction in the book-to-market ratio).  The results for the change in the book-to-
market ratio are weaker than for the change in ROA.  Only two variables, LASSET and 
OWNSEC have significant estimated coefficients.  Thus, increases in bank loans do not appear 
to improve the market’s valuation of distressed firms.  
Tables 6 and 7 provide results with the changes in loans aggregated over time (two-year 
and three-year changes in loans) and split into main bank loans and secondary bank loans, given 
that the results in Table 5 suggest that changes in main bank and secondary bank loans may have 
had differential effects.  In Table 6, neither of the loan variables are significant at standard levels 
of significance, although the estimated coefficients on main bank loans are positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level for both of the ROA equations.  Using the three-year horizon 
change in loans shown in Table 7, main bank loans now have a significant positive effect for the 
one-year ROA, while the effect is significant at the 10 percent level for the two-year ROA.  This 
suggests that, in fact, increases in main bank loans contribute to an improvement in the ROA of a 
distressed firm, although, as before, no impact is observed for the market-based measure of firm 
performance. 
The specifications in Table 8 use the three-year horizon for the change in loans and allow 
positive changes in loans to have an effect that differs from negative changes in loans.  Only two 
of the loan variables have significant effects:  increases in main bank loans for the one-year 
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change in ROA and decreases in secondary bank loans for both horizons of the change in ROA.  
While the estimated coefficients are similar for increases and decreases in main bank loans, that 
is not the case for secondary bank loans.  While increases in main bank loans are associated with 
improved subsequent firm performance, the negative estimated coefficient on decreases in 
secondary bank loans implies that the more secondary banks cut loans to a distressed firm, the 
more the improvement in firm performance.  One possible explanation is that the decline in 
secondary bank loans is a result of the firm concentrating its lending with its main bank.  To the 
extent that a financially distressed firm will need help from its lenders, concentrating its lending 
among a few banks will make any negotiations less complicated.  Again, changes in loans appear 
to have no effect on the market-based measure of firm performance.   
Tables 9 and 10 present results for the Table 8 specification for three subperiods:  the 
1980s, the first half of the 1990s, and the second half of the 1990.  The results may differ across 
these three subperiods insofar as the problems were less widespread and less long-lasting in the 
1980s, and bank health was not as precarious.  The first half of the 1990s occurred after the 
bubbles burst, but before the banks came under serious regulatory pressure.  During the second 
half of the 1990s, the economy still was weak and the bank crisis intensified, with banks facing 
perverse incentives to evergreen loans rather than allocate credit to those firms with the best 
prospects.   
Table 9 contains the results for the one-year horizon of subsequent firm performance.  As 
with the full-sample results, increases in main bank loans and decreases in secondary bank loans 
are associated with increases in ROA.  However, in contrast to the earlier results, increases in 
main bank loans have a significant effect on the book-to-market ratio at the one-year horizon 
during the first half of the 1990s.  The negative estimated coefficient indicates that increases in 
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main bank loans are associated with a deterioration in the market’s valuation of a distressed firm.  
Thus, the results are in conflict with the positive contribution of increases in main bank loans on 
the accounting measure of firm performance.  The results for the two-year horizon for firm 
performance shown in Table 10 are similar to those in Table 9, although the negative estimated 
coefficient on increases in main bank loans for the market-based measure of firm performance in 
the first half of the 1990s is significant only at the 10 percent level.  Importantly, while the 
evidence suggests that increases in main bank loans helped improve the subsequent ROA of 
distressed firms in the 1980s, no evidence is found that bank lending contributed to improved 
performance during the last half of the 1990s when banks were under severe financial stress. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results:  Operational Distress 
Tables 11 through 16 repeat the specifications shown in Tables 5 through 10 for the set of 
firms entering operational distress based on experiencing two consecutive years of negative net 
income following a year of positive net income.  Overall, the results for firms entering 
operational distress parallel those for firms entering financial distress.  Consequently, the 
comments are focused on the final two tables that contain the subperiod results.  As for firms 
entering financial distress, the results suggest that increases in loans by main banks during the 
1980s are associated with improved ROA, as are decreases in loans by secondary banks in both 
the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  The key difference is that for operational distress, one 
loan variable now has a significant effect in the second half of the 1990s:  increases in loans by 
secondary banks are associated with improved ROA.  Perhaps the added credit from secondary 
banks at a time when main banks were particularly stressed and less able to help, contributed to 




V.  Conclusions 
Previous evidence suggests that Japanese banks were misallocating credit in the 1990s, 
especially in the latter half, by evergreening loans to zombie firms.  Still, it may have been the 
case that at the same time, Japanese banks were helping distressed, but viable, firms.  While 
increased loans to zombie firms simply allowed them to continue to operate and delayed the 
creative destruction that was needed to reallocate resources to more productive uses, to the extent 
that Japanese banks were able to identify distressed, but viable, firms and provide the credit 
needed for them to restructure their operations to enable them to recover, banks could have 
contributed to a shortening of the economic malaise suffered in Japan during the lost decade.   
The evidence in this study does not support the hypothesis that Japanese banks were able 
to contribute to the recovery of distressed firms by increasing loans to those firms in the latter 
half of the 1990s.  While this study does find evidence that increases in main bank loans to 
distressed firms during the 1980s did contribute to their recovery based on the accounting 
measure (ROA) of firm performance, no such effect if found for the 1990s.  In fact, using the 
book-to-market measure of firm performance, increased main bank loans during the 1991-95 
subperiod are associated with a deterioration in firm performance.  However, in general, the 
specifications using the market-based measure of firm performance (book-to-market ratio), 
produces few significant effects.  If one interprets these specifications as essentially trying to 
explain future stock prices, such weak results would not be surprising.  
 
 
Table 1: Number of Firms Entering Distress and the Prevalence of Receiving Increased Bank Loans 

































(t-3) to t 
1980 2 0 100 100 100 3 0 100 100 67 
1981 6 0 67 100 100 7 0 71 86 86 
1982 27 0 67 93 93 29 0 66 93 93 
1983 28 1 54 75 93 28 1 54 75 93 
1984 5 0 60 80 60 6 2 67 83 50 
1985 8 1 50 75 75 8 2 62 75 62 
1986 14 2 57 64 57 16 2 62 69 62 
1987 12 2 50 67 83 13 2 46 54 69 
1988 1 1 100 0 100 1 1 100 0 100 
1989 1 0 0 0 100 1 0 0 0 100 
1990 4 2 75 75 75 4 2 75 75 75 
1991 8 1 50 50 75 10 2 40 40 70 
1992 18 2 44 83 78 18 3 50 89 83 
1993 69 16 62 70 81 68 17 63 71 78 
1994 54 19 52 65 67 61 20 51 66 67 
1995 27 5 70 59 59 28 7 75 68 68 
1996 16 4 50 56 62 16 4 50 56 56 
1997 19 6 58 79 79 20 6 55 75 75 
1998 62 16 68 76 76 59 13 69 78 76 
1999 78 26 44 65 73 78 26 44 65 74 
2000 39 16 26 36 49 36 17 25 36 53 
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Table 2: Timing of Bottom Relative to Entering Distress (t=0): Financial Distress 
Timing -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
1980 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 11 11 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1983 8 17 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 4 8 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1992 3 11 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1993 14 42 9 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1994 17 21 6 3 0 1 1 2 1 2 
1995 4 13 2 6 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1996 3 9 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
1997 8 4 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1998 17 26 10 4 1 2 0 0 0 2 
1999 19 39 11 4 1 1 0 0 0 3 
2000 19 11 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 




Table 3: Timing of Bottom Relative to Entering Distress (t=0): Operational Distress 
Timing -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A 
1980 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1981 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 10 15 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 9 17 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 1 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1986 5 9 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1989 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1990 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 1 3 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 4 11 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1993 18 41 7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1994 19 24 9 3 1 1 0 2 0 2 
1995 11 11 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1996 5 7 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1997 6 6 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
1998 15 27 7 5 2 1 0 0 0 2 
1999 21 40 9 3 1 1 0 0 0 3 
2000 15 10 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 153 240 64 26 7 5 3 3 1 8 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Regression Sample: Financial Distress 
 Untransformed Variables Transformed Variables 
 MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX 
D1ROA 3.028 6.058 -27.179 33.231 2.959 6.038 -27.142 32.661 
D12ROA 3.392 6.831 -28.548 30.908 3.37 6.785 -28.118 30.815 
D1BKMKT 2.755 37.682 -238.735 144.889 -0.637 35.505 -230.419 124.056
D12BKMKT 11.952 55.806 -222.934 238.517 3.216 51.142 -241.245 236.56 
LEV 0.728 0.184 0.123 1.261 0.118 0.164 -0.471 0.461 
LASSET 4.723 0.583 3.259 6.658 -0.006 0.551 -1.501 1.858 
BONDA 0.062 0.089 0 0.406 0.029 0.089 -0.133 0.383 
OWNFIN 0.285 0.142 0 0.662 -0.034 0.142 -0.374 0.343 
OWNSEC 0.015 0.016 0 0.095 0.007 0.015 -0.023 0.076 
OWNCORP 0.339 0.181 0.042 0.824 0.072 0.178 -0.265 0.605 
OWNFOR 0.028 0.042 0 0.314 -0.001 0.041 -0.091 0.27 
KEIR 0.452 0.498 0 1     
BKHLTH -0.482 0.267 -1.595 -0.066     
MBLNSH 0.224 0.157 0 0.929 0.018 0.153 -0.306 0.689 
DLNT 0.016 0.06 -0.239 0.349 0.015 0.064 -0.277 0.304 
DLNT1 0.033 0.066 -0.188 0.346 0.028 0.066 -0.266 0.298 
DLNT2 0.018 0.055 -0.179 0.265 0.015 0.057 -0.18 0.238 
DLNMB 0.004 0.025 -0.109 0.107 0.006 0.024 -0.115 0.105 
DLNMB1 0.007 0.022 -0.088 0.116 0.006 0.022 -0.073 0.13 
DLNMB2 0.003 0.017 -0.103 0.12 0.004 0.018 -0.088 0.119 
DLNMB2Y 0.011 0.032 -0.161 0.15 0.012 0.031 -0.123 0.147 
DLNSB2Y 0.038 0.074 -0.345 0.355 0.03 0.08 -0.374 0.351 
DLNMB3Y 0.015 0.037 -0.119 0.202 0.016 0.036 -0.1 0.184 
DLNSB3Y 0.055 0.095 -0.436 0.543 0.043 0.103 -0.468 0.503 
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Table 5:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
  
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 








































































































































Adjusted R2 0.127 0.077 -0.006 0.017 
Observations 498 494 485 478 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level
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Table 6:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT)








































































































Adjusted R2 0.119 0.079 -0.001 0.021 
Observations 498 494 485 478 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 7:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.129 0.080 -0.002 0.019 
Observations 498 494 485 478 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Table 8:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT)
























































































































Adjusted R2 0.156 0.092 -0.005 0.015 
Observations 498 494 485 478 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 9:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Subperiod 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D1ROA D1ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D1BKMKT) -(D1BKMKT)






















































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.407 0.140 0.102 0.011 0.141 0.002 
Observations 108 176 214 107 176 202 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 10:  Financial Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Subperiod 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
Dependent 
Variable D12ROA D12ROA D12ROA -(D12BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT)




















































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.191 0.112 0.023 -0.016 0.170 0.011 
Observations 105 176 213 105 176 197 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 11:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 








































































































































Adjusted R2 0.135 0.065 -0.007 0.017 
Observations 510 505 498 491 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 34
Table 12:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.114 0.066 0.001 0.022 
Observations 510 505 498 491 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 13:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 








































































































Adjusted R2 0.125 0.068 -0.001 0.017 
Observations 510 505 498 491 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 36
Table 14:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Dependent 
Variable D1ROA D12ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) 
























































































































Adjusted R2 0.145 0.077 -0.002 0.014 
Observations 510 505 498 491 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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Table 15:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Subperiod 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
Dependent Variable D1ROA D1ROA D1ROA -(D1BKMKT) -(D1BKMKT) -(D1BKMKT)




















































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.379 0.121 0.093 -0.002 0.109 0.005 
Observations 116 185 209 115 185 198 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
 38
Table 16:  Operational Distress: Effects on Firm Performance 
 
Subperiod 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 1980-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
Dependent 
Variable D12ROA D12ROA D12ROA -(D12BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT) -(D12BKMKT)




















































































































































































Adjusted R2 0.187 0.098 0.046 -0.028 0.117 0.007 
Observations 112 184 209 113 185 193 
 
p-values in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 1% level 
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1  A number of studies provide detailed discussions of the characteristics of keiretsu groups and the roles 
that keiretsu firm relationships play; see, for example, Aoki 1990; Weinstein and Yafeh 1998; Dewenter 
2003.  
 
2 To induce stability in main bank relationships over time, given that these are deemed to be long-term 
relationships, the main bank series for a firm is smoothed in instances in which the main bank switches 
back and forth between banks by requiring a bank to exceed the loans to the firm of the previous main 
bank by at least 10 percent in order to become the new main bank. 
